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for pur-
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tive.
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makes
to motiou
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method to
that it was
made
to move to set aside such onkr under
§
and notice of such motion is
where inadYertcnce in
order was not thnt of court
and did not
of
for
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and oppose, at
the motion for
of
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~\lrLLEH
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Gildfor

F'itz-Gerald

and Allen

unverified
menced an action in San Francisco
death of Philip Dadella, the husband and father of
Named a::; defendaJJts are .Mr. all(I .Mrs.
Earl
and four other defendants. 1t is
tlw l\lillers were the
of
stables in Sonoma
owners and
and were owuers or
owners or ill
of a horse
named "Saltie"; that the Millers leased a portion of the
stables to defendant George inelnding a stall in wllich Saltie
was stabled, and
the Millers alld the ot}H'I' four defendants
jointly
and controlled the horse; that
t·esides in San Francisco; that on
19, 1950, the horse
was negligently left unattended at the stables and
reason
of his known dangerous
attacked Philip Badella,
deceased, causing
to him which resulteL1 ill his death
on :B'ebruary 1, 1951.
Defendant George auswered
issues and
pleaded contributory negligence; the other defendants demurred. All the defendants, except
notieed a motion
for a change of venue to Sonoma County, 011 the
that they were residents of that county and George was
named defendant solely for the purpose of
the action
tried in San Francisco under section 395 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.* [1] Under that section the action is
properly triable in San Francisco if any of the defendants
reside there nnless snch resident defendant 1vas made a
solely for the purpose of
the action tried tllrrc.
·~• 'If the action be for nqury to person, . . . or for death from
wrongful act, or negligence, either the i'Otmty where the
or where the injury causing death or,enrs, or the county in
defendants, or some of them, rcsidG
the commencement of the action.
~hall ho a
county for the trial of the action. . . If
as a defendant or lws been made a
tho aetion tried in the
resides,
residence
not be conRidered in
place for the trial of the action." (Code Civ. Proc.,
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the case
San
Bat1ella eommeneed an action for his
a1l c1 it
moved to
no
!lamed defendant. After his death
death 1vas eonnnenced in San !<'ranDoes as defendants
iJJ San !<'ranmotion vvas made to transfer that action and while
dismissed it. Plaintiffs' counsel
"strong desire" to
the trial in San Pranciseo
and sai(1 he IYonld file a new action so drawn that it could be
there. The afflc1avits of defendants, o! her than George,
stated their Sonoma
residem~e and that no relation
of master and servant or principal and agent existed between
the other defendants and them and that George had no conpo:sse,ssJon of or emmection with the horse. George stated
in his affidavit that neither he nor any of his employees had
any conneetion with the hor,;e.
'l'he motion was noticed for Septembrr 5. 1951, and dne
serYiee \Yns made on plain tiffs' attonwys. On that date the
motion eame on for hearing. Plaintiffs did not appear at
the
nor file afthlavits. The
on that date, made
a formal written orcler granting the motion a11d
the aetion transferred to Sonoma Count~· on the
that nndPr def('ndants' affidavits
was mlmerl
c1efendant
for tl1r pnrpose of haYing the aetion tried
in San F'ranciseo. On the same rlate. ilc-cnrding to the elerk'><
a '' 1Hinute Order'' was made as fol1o·ws : ''In
eormsel for defendants prrsent, the em1rt ordcrrd
motion for
of venue granted.
"In this action, the conrt on its own motion, ordered order
heretofore made granting motion for ehange of venue, be
set aside." In explanation of the last sentence of the minnte
order, the following appears: 'l'hP jnc1gr stated in a letter
elated September 5, 1951, addressed to defendants' attorneys
(copies sent to plaintiffs' eonnse1) whieh may be considered a memorandum opinion, that after def,ndants' eounsel
had 1eft the eourt after the !waring on thE' motion alld
apparently after the filing of the formal order, plaintiffs'
(>ounsel appeared about two hours late and explained his

the
obassert
order was not
entered
the clerk uiJtil at the same time the order
it 'Yas made
minute order heretofore
) ; tl1at a
not effective until entered and the order was
wh}ch it was made and
the conrt
that
it yaeated on
' counsel
Tn Maxwell v
116 Cal.
, it \Yas
out that an order
of venue need not have findthat a
and filed order
the
need
not be entei'ed to be
page
"Section 1003 of the Coc1e of Civil Procedme states that 'every
direction
.. made or entered in
and
not inel
a
is dcnominatec1 an order.' As
was stated
Von Schmidt v. Widber, 99 Cal.
514 [34
P. 109] :
of law ~which requires

(b); 4
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to the order.
served
of time for
assertion that it was his intention that his 'effective
and entered
be set forth in a minute order to be
in the minntrs
the clrrk cannot d0tract from the fact that
the rnlin~? which he l1ad
and filed was itself
his final
determination on the merits of the motion
of v0nne-" The forma! order was, therefore,
for
an pffective final
the motion to
and
The order
separate and
order.
It has been held that when a court makes an unconditional order
a case
to motion to change
venue, it loses
to vacate the order as jurisdiction
has passci! to the court to which the action is ordered transferred. (Chase
J 54 Cal. 789 f 99 P. 355},
where the trial court vacated the order for failure of defendant to pay fees in the county to which the action was
transferred as thr>n required by the statute; now plaintiff
must pay thrm; Code Civ. Proc., § 399; Refrigeration Discount
91
295 [204 P.2d
932].) And it has been stated generally that once the order
for transfrr has been
the court from which it is transferred has no further jurisdiction to make any further order
or take any fnrther steps in the action.
v. Superior
Court, 47
124 [190 P. 202], trial court awarded
alimony after order of transfer; Hatch v. GalV?:n, 50 Cal.
441, court
to trial;
46 Cal.App.
519
792 [190 P. 49] Foote
[10 P.2d
; sec Rilcoff v.
50 Cal.App.2d
503 [123 P.2d 540].) Those
on the theory
that an order
the action is final as it is appealable (Code Civ. Proc., § 963, subd. 2) and the provision that
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the court

which an action is transferred shall exercise
over the action the same as if it had been commenced there. (Code Civ.
§ 399.)
On the other
hand, Baker v. Fireman's F'und Ins.
73 Cal. JR2 [14
P. 686], holds that after the court has made an order transferring an action it may vacate it on the
upon
, ·which held that a court had inherent
power to vacate an order
was not a
vertently made. Tile conrt in Christin
9 Cal.2d 526, 531
P.2d
112 A.L.R.
states that a motion could be made in the
court
to vacate the order of transfer. It does not appear that the
finality and appealability of an order changing venue, nor
the provision that the court to which the transfE'r is made
should thereafter exercise jurisdiction (Code Civ.
§ 399), should preclude the court making the order from considering a motion to vacate such order made according to
some recognized procedure and on some
That court orc1inaril:v is in a brtter
to pass upon such a
motion and should have an opportunity to correct its rrrors.
\Ve believe, therefore. that Baker v. Fireman's Fund Ins.
Co., snpra, 73 Cal. J 82, is controlling here. 'l'he other cases.
Axcept possibly Refrigeration Discount Corp. v. Superior
Court, supra, !11 Cal.App.2d 295, do not involve t bat precisr
question; the Refrigeration case insofar as it does is disapproved.
There still remains,
the
of whethrr Hw
order vacating the ordE'r granting the motion to change venuf~
was effectual inasmuch as no notice vvas given that it was
to be made or hearing had upon it. [4] We believe that
the orderly procedure was to move to set aside the order
granting the motion to change venue under section 473 of
the Code of Civil Procedure 1 and notice thereof was required.2 It was a proper case for application for relief under
that section. (See McGuire v. D1·ew, 83 Cal. 225 [23 P. 312];
Bouvett v. Layer, 40 Cal.App.2d 43 [104 P.2d 1151; Gray v.
Sabin, 87 CaL 211 [25 P. 422]; Yancey v. National Ben.
Assn., 122 Cal. 676 [55 P. f3041 ; Startzman v. Los Banos Cotuu»u..'""J'vu

lrrhe court 1na y reliei/C a
taken
against him tln:ongh his
neglect.
"Notice must be gi,-en of a motion under section 473. (McDonald v.
Severy, 6 Cal.2d 629 [59 P.2d 98]; Linstead v. Superior Court, 17 Cal.
App.2d 9 l61 P.2d 355].)
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v. Hotchkis,
'
The
order changing
in absence of counsel and
that
in
by deof whether they should

have relief under that section.
On the
of notice it has been said
"
that the
has inherent power either on its ovvn
or on ex
or on notice, to set aside
an order or
taken through its own inadvertence
or mistake; that a
entered order is such an
and that application pursuant to section 473
of the Corle of Civil Procedure is not necessary." (Estate of
Costa, B7 Cal.2d
157 [231 P.2d 17].) Some of the cases
cited for that proposition (Key
'Transit Lines v. Su36 Ca1.2d 184
P.2d 867]; Iloltum v. Grief.
144 Cal. 521 [78 P. 11]; Phillips v. 'Trnsheirn, 25 Cal.2d 913
156 P.2d 25] : Raines v. Damon, 89 Cal.App.2d 812 [201
P .2d
) hold only that the conrt has inherent power, that
is, power in addition to that granted by statute, to vacate an
order made as a result of its inadYertence. Nothing is said
about whether notice and hraring arP necessary for the exercise of such inherent power. In the other cases (Robson v.
Superior Court, 171 Cal. 588 [154 P. 8] ; Whitney v. Sttperior
Court, 147 Cal. fi:i6
P. 87]: Harris v. M·innesota Inv. Co.,
i:i9 Cal.App. 396 [ 265 P. 3061 ; Prople v. Curh:s, 113 Cal. 68
[45 P. 180]) it was held that the conrt could on its own
motion, thus without notier. vaeate its order made by reason
of its inar1vertence. It dors not appear whether the court
was speaking: of a clerieal Prror by the court or inadvertence
in exercising its judicial pmYer. Tn all of them, except possibly the Hobson casP. it seems that the inadvertence appearPd
on the face of tltP rec·ord. '"as within the judge's own knowledge, or the facts were undisputed. Tn the Robson case it
vvas pointed ont that the party as to whom the new trial
was denied, which denial was later set aside, bad not acted
inadvertently or done or failed to do anything he should
have done. In Estate of Costa. supra, 37 Cal.2d 154, the
hearing, resulting· in the order which was set aside, was had at
10 a. m. inst<,atl of 2 p. m .. the timr stated for the hearing
in the register of aetions. Anr1 in ]( ey System 'Transit Lines
v. Superior Court, supra, 36 Cal.2d 184, 188, the court pointed
out that ''Here the later order was in effect based on the
inadvertencr and mistake of the court in overlooking matters

829) :
has been
a clerical error in the record of a judgment
may be made
the court
withmtt notice and on the
court's own motion. . . . 'l'he above cases cited may be
·where a clerical error appears
classified as follows: (
on the
the recot·d. . . . [Citing
Where
the existence of sueh an error is
upon the memory
and
of the
some cases
that his
declaration on the matter is conclusive.
[Citing cases.]
(3)\Vhere the statement on the
m the decision is
dictum . . . .
"On the other hand there are eases
that where
a clerical error does not appear on the face of the record but
must be proved
evidence
notice of a motion to
correet sueh an error is necessary if substantial
are
involved. . . .
cases.)
"In any event
as in the case at bar, the
has
no eonnection with
of the assertPd error in
the record
one of the filing date of
the notice of intention to move for a new trial, a matter
solely in the domain of the clerk of the
and it docs not
appear on the faee of the
notice of a motion to correct
the
error should be a jurisdictional requirement.''
In the instant case, however, we do not have either clerical
error or
inadvertence. The inadvertence, if any,
was not that of the court and did not appear on the reeord.
It was the inadvertence of eounsel for
in failing to
present counteraffidavits and appear and oppose, at the time
set for the hearing
the motion for
of venue.
He asserted he had an exeuse and had endeavored to proteet
himself
the
to
that he would
be late. 'l'he eourt in
venue said,
in
that if he had known counsel had advised his secretary that he would be late he would not have proceeded.
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defendants' motion

reach ihe question of
of ven ne should
ont above it appears that the order
order
defendants' motion for
in0rrectual. The formal order granting
of venue stam1R sn bject to such
be proper. The order denying
a
of venne is reversed.
Edmonds,

Traynor, J., and

eoncnr in t }w jndgnwnt solely on the
trial court 1ras "without power to set aside
aetion and rrgnlarly made, and
different oriler trithout not·ice to the adv. Ten
(1941), 16 Cal.2d 829, 834
. Juno Oil Co. (1954), 42 Cal.2d
j ; BoFd v. Ji'a.rmcrs d'; Merchants Nat. Bank
848 [149 P.2d 722].)

